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INTRODUCTION 
 
Many court observers perceive the Seventh Circuit to be hostile to 
civil rights claims, including employment discrimination claims.1 
Some attribute this perceived bias to the law and economics bent of 
some of the Circuit’s more prominent jurists.2 However, in 2006, 
within a four month span, the Seventh Circuit published three opinions 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., 2002, Wesleyan University 
1 See Paul W. Mollica, Employment Discrimination Cases in the Seventh 
Circuit, 1 EMPL. RTS. & EMPL. POL’Y J. 63, 92, 96-99 (1997) (noting the perception 
of Seventh Circuit’s employer bias and highlighting the numerous instances of 
fiercely anti-plaintiff and anti-EEOC rhetoric in Seventh Circuit employment 
discrimination opinions compared to the paucity of similar attacks against employers 
and their attorneys); see also Chicago Council of Lawyers, Evaluation of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 764-64, 
771, 778, 780-81, 782, 785-86, 791-92, 822 (1994) (discussing several Seventh 
Circuit jurists’ pro-government and pro-employer records in civil rights and 
employment discrimination cases). 
2 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOKLYN L. REV. 
67, 128 (1995); see also Chicago Council of Lawyers, Evaluation of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, supra note 1, at 812. 
1
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that reversed the same district court judge, Judge Samuel Der-
Yeghiayan, in favor of employment discrimination plaintiffs.3 The 
Seventh Circuit eventually published five opinions in 2006 that treated 
Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s summary judgment rulings in employment 
discrimination cases. In all five cases, the district court granted the 
employers’ motions for summary judgment.4 However, the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions in their entirety only 
twice.5 In light of the Seventh Circuit’s historic 22% reversal rate for 
plaintiffs in employment discrimination summary judgment appeals,6 
the Court’s 60% reversal rate of Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s decisions is 
surprising. Without a doubt, five cases is a small sample set. 
Nonetheless, three employment discrimination opinions that reverse 
the same judge within a four month period are sufficient to provoke 
curiosity. Notably, in 2006, the Seventh Circuit never reversed any 
other district court judge’s summary judgment employment 
discrimination decisions more than once.7  
                                                 
3 Paz v. Wauconda Healthcare and Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 464 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 
2006); Thanongsinh v. Bd. of Educ., 462 F.3d 762 (7th Cir. 2006); and Valentine v. 
City of Chicago, 452 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 2006). 
4 Thanongsinh v. Sch. Dist. U-46, No. 05-3002, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16457, 
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 13, 2005); Pruitt v. City of Chicago, No. 03 C 2877, 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 44274, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 8, 2005); Paz v. Wauconda Healthcare and 
Rehab. Ctr., LLC, No. 04 C 3341, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10554, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
May 23, 2005); Crawford v. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co., No. 04 C 2977, 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 10553, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2005); Valentine v. City of Chicago, 
No. 03 C 2918, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 430, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2005).  
5 Pruitt v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 925 (7th Cir. 2006); Crawford v. Ind. 
Harbor Belt R.R. Co., 461 F.3d 844 (7th Cir. 2006). 
6 Mollica, supra note 1, at 77. In an empirical study of the court’s employment 
discrimination decisions from 1992 to 1996, the author found that the Seventh 
Circuit’s reversal rate for plaintiffs in summary judgment cases was 21.77%. Id. 
Since the study’s completion, the court’s composition has changed very little, losing 
Judge Walter Cummings, and adding Judge Diane Sykes and Judge Ann Williams. 
7 In 2006, the Seventh Circuit published 49 opinions dealing with appeals from 
summary judgment rulings in employment discrimination cases. During this period, 
the court reversed summary judgment decisions in favor of plaintiffs in 12 opinions. 
Thus, 25% of those 12 opinions reversed Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s rulings. The 
remaining 9 opinions each reversed decisions by different district court judges: 
2
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Moreover, the Seventh Circuit’s reversals of summary judgment 
decisions are always intriguing to a degree, for as Judge Posner noted 
in the employment discrimination decision Shager v. Upjohn Co.,8 
growing docket pressures on trial courts make the courts of appeals 
extremely reluctant to overrule grants of summary judgments by lower 
courts “merely because a rational factfinder could return a verdict for 
the nonmoving party, if such a verdict is highly unlikely as a practical 
matter.”9 So what explains the Seventh Circuit’s lack of reluctance in 
reversing Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s rulings during this brief period? 
Perhaps the Court is sending the recently-appointed district court 
judge a message? To this end, some will undoubtedly speculate that 
political forces motivate these three decisions. Indeed, at first blush, 
the cynical specter of political partisanship certainly appears to hover 
over these reversed decisions. This is because Judge Der-Yeghiayan 
was recently appointed to the Northern District Court of Illinois by 
                                                                                                                   
Goodwin v. Bd of Trs. Of the Univ. of Ill., 442 F.3d 611 (2006) (reversing Chief 
Judge McKinney); Maalik v. Int’l Union of Elevator Constructors, Local 2, 437 F.3d 
650 (2006) (reversing Judge Kennelly); Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773 
(2006) (reversing Judge Marovich); EEOC v. Target Corp., 460 F.3d 946 (2006) 
(reversing Chief Judge Randa); Patton v. Keystone RV Co., 455 F.3d 812 (2006) 
(reversing Chief Judge Miller); Roe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704 (2006) 
(reversing Judge Darrah); Smith v. Castaways Family Diner, 453 F.3d 971 (2006) 
(reversing Judge Sharp); Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Vills. Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900 
(reversing Judge Guzman); Burnett v. LFW Inc., 472 F.3d 471 (2006) (reversing 
Judge Kocoras).  
This dataset was developed by culling all of the Seventh Circuit’s published 
opinions in Lexis’s Seventh Circuit database that decided cases under the chief 
federal anti-discrimination statutes creating private rights of action: Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000); the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000); the 
Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000); the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791, 
794 (2000); the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 
(2000); sections 1981 and 1983 of Title 42, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (2000) 
(including only those 1983 cases involving employment discrimination); and the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654. 
8 913 F.2d 398, 403 (7th Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original). 
9 Id. at 403. 
3
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President George W. Bush,10 a president whose disregard for 
employment discrimination rights is often noted by his critics.11 
Therefore, perhaps these three decisions constitute a check on the 
current administration’s attempt to curtail employment discrimination 
rights’ statutes through judicial appointment.  
On a purely surface level, the possibility of a political subtext is 
reinforced by the fact that Judge Richard Posner and Judge Frank 
Easterbrook authored the only two 2006 opinions12 that affirmed the 
entirety of Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s summary judgment decisions in 
favor of employers. This fact supports such a possibility because many 
view Judges Posner and Easterbrook as sympathetic to the Executive 
Branch’s conservative policies and hostile to employment 
discrimination plaintiffs.13 
On the one hand, a close reading of the Seventh Circuit’s three 
opinions14 that reverse the district court does indeed elicit a slight 
aroma of employer bias wafting from Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s 
decisions. One may suspect such a bias because these decisions 
uniformly adopt a disapproving and critical view of the district court’s 
reasoning and attention to detail,15 and because the district court’s 
                                                 
10 Bill Meyers, He has a reputation for being open, giving, CHICAGO DAILY 
LAW BULLETIN, Aug. 20, 2003 (discussing August 2003 appointment of Judge Der-
Yeghiayan). 
11 See, e.g., Alia Malek, Bush civil rights nominee under fire, SALON, Jul. 28, 
2007, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/07/28/eeoc/index.html?source=sear 
ch&aim=/news/feature (describing reaction of president’s critics to president’s 
efforts to install a new commissioner at the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission); See infra Part II.  
12 Pruitt v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 925 (7th Cir. 2006); Crawford v. Ind. 
Harbor Belt R.R. Co., 461 F.3d 844 (7th Cir. 2006). 
13 See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 2. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A 
SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006) 
(defending executive branch measures such as warrantless surveillance against 
critics’ contentions that such measures are unconstitutional). 
14 Paz v. Wauconda Healthcare and Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 464 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 
2006); Thanongsinh v. Bd. of Educ., 462 F.3d 762 (7th Cir. 2006); and Valentine v. 
City of Chicago, 452 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 2006). 
15 See infra Part I.D. 
4
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flaws always managed to benefit employers. In addition, the tenor of 
the Seventh Circuit’s three opinions generally reflects disbelief that the 
plaintiffs had been unable to withstand summary judgment.16 Thus, 
when viewed in the context of the President George W. Bush’s policy 
concerning employment discrimination rights and his strategy to 
appoint federal judges that will carry out his policy preferences on the 
bench,17 it is tempting to conclude that the Seventh Circuit’s reversals 
of the President’s recent appointee contain a political subtext. 
However, these three opinions cannot be read as a political rebuke 
of a partisan district judge. The conservative reputations of the 
opinion’s authors18 and the panelists19 that joined the opinions 
undermine such speculation. Nor can these opinions be read as an 
admonishment of the district judge for harboring an employer bias. 
The Court’s criticisms of the district court are simply not severe 
enough to suggest such judicial impropriety.20 Nonetheless, the 
Seventh Circuit’s three opinions do provide a fascinating prism 
through which one can recognize the imprint of the President’s policy 
preferences on a sampling of his appointee’s rulings. In addition, 
although these opinions do not likely represent a political check on the 
President’s attempt to shape policy through judicial appointment, these 
opinions do reflect the Seventh Circuit’s efforts to bring a new, slightly 
overzealous district judge more in line with some of the Seventh 
Circuit’s more salient institutional traits. Specifically, these three 
opinions reflect the Court’s warnings to district court judges to avoid 
using summary judgment motion as a means of docket control. In 
addition, these opinions comport with the Court’s general 
unwillingness to allow hyper-technical barriers to proof of an 
employer’s motive or intent to discriminate. 
This comment explores three Seventh Circuit opinions that 
reversed the decisions of the same district court to determine what, if 
                                                 
16 See infra Part I.D. 
17 See infra Part II. 
18 Judges Bauer, Ripple, and Flaum. See infra Part III. 
19 Including Judges Posner and Kanne. See infra Part III. 
20 See infra Part III. 
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anything, the Court is communicating to the district judge, and what 
the Court’s message says about the Seventh Circuit and certain 
tendencies in the Seventh Circuit’s employment discrimination 
jurisprudence. Part I introduces the three opinions that reverse the 
summary judgment rulings of District Court Judge Samuel Der-
Yeghiayan. Part II explores the hypothesis that the Seventh Circuit’s 
criticisms of the district judge contain a political subtext. Part III 
rejects the argument that the Seventh Circuit intended its opinions to 
communicate a political message. Part IV argues that the criticisms in 
these opinions can be explained as an effort to “socialize” a newly-
appointed district judge. 
 
I. THE REVERSED DECISIONS 
 
The three Seventh Circuit opinions21 that reversed the district 
court’s summary judgment rulings point towards a consistent pattern 
in Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s employment discrimination decisions. This 
pattern suggests that the district court judge tends to dispose of his 
employment discrimination cases too quickly, often through a 
misplaced, myopic reliance on technicalities and an inattention to 
critical facts contained in the record. 
 
A. Thanongsinh v. Board of Education 
 
In Thanongsinh v. Board of Education, 22 Thanongsinh, a school 
custodian, filed a Title VII23 claim against his employer, alleging, inter 
alia, that the school demoted him based on his race—Asian-American 
of Chinese and Laotian descent. Thanongsinh had been a custodian at 
the school for ten years, receiving uniformly effusive praise from his 
                                                 
21 Paz v. Wauconda Healthcare and Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 464 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 
2006); Thanongsinh v. Bd. of Educ., 462 F.3d 762 (7th Cir. 2006); and Valentine v. 
City of Chicago, 452 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 2006). 
22 462 F.3d. at 766, 769.  
23 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000). 
6
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supervisors.24 In 2002, due to budgetary constraints, the school 
administered a two-part written and oral exam to phase out the 
highest-paid custodians.25 Thanongsinh failed the exam and was 
subsequently demoted.26 He alleged, inter alia, that his supervisor 
administered the oral portion of his exam in a racially discriminatory 
manner.27 Specifically, he contended that whereas his supervisor gave 
him an automatic zero on one portion of the oral exam for forgetting to 
bring relevant forms, the same supervisor allowed a Caucasian 
employee, who similarly forgot to bring the same forms, to take and 
pass that portion of the exam.28 In addition, Thanongsinh alleged that 
the school’s supervisor denigrated Thanongsinh’s English language 
abilities at a grievance hearing convened to review his demotion.29 
Under Title VII a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of 
employment discrimination in response to a motion for summary 
judgment in one of two ways: by producing direct or circumstantial 
evidence under the “direct method” of proof; or by utilizing the 
indirect, burden-shifting method set forth in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green.30 Thanongsinh relied on the indirect method,31 which 
required him to demonstrate that he: (1) is a member of a protected 
class; (2) is qualified for the position sought; (3) was rejected for the 
position; and (4) was treated less favorably than similarly situated 
individuals outside of his protected class.32 In response, the school had 
to assert a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the demotion.33 
Finally, Thanongsinh had to produce sufficient evidence from which a 
reasonable factfinder could conclude that the school’s asserted reason 
                                                 
24 Thanongsinh, 462 F.3d at 767. 
25 Id. at 767. 
26 Id. at 767-68. 
27 Id. at 769. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 768. 
30 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
31 Thanongsinh, 462 F.3d at 772. 
32 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
33 See id. at 802-03.  
7
Wright: The Politics of Reversal: The Seventh Circuit Reins in a District
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 3, Issue 1                           Fall 2007 
 
 175
was pretextual.34 The parties only contested whether: Thanongsinh 
was qualified; he was treated less favorably than similarly situated 
individuals outside of his protected class; and the employer’s proffered 
non-discriminatory reason for the demotion was pretextual.35 
The district court granted the school’s motion for summary 
judgment on all counts,36 disregarding a wealth of credible evidence 
that: Thanongsinh had been uniformly praised as an outstanding 
employee prior to the test; a Caucasian custodian who took the oral 
exam was treated preferentially; and the school’s asserted non-
discriminatory reason for demotion—Thanongsinh’s poor performance 
on the exam—was pretext. First, the district court held that 
Thanongsinh was not a qualified employee because he failed the 
certification exam.37 Second, the district court held that Thanongsinh 
failed to identify similarly situated individuals who were treated more 
favorably because the evidence relied on by Thanongsinh to establish 
this fact would have been inadmissible at trial.38 Third, the district 
court held that even if Thanongsinh could establish a prima facie case, 
he could not discredit the school’s asserted non-discriminatory reason 
for his demotion—that Thanongsinh failed the certification exam.39  
The Seventh Circuit disagreed with Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s 
reasoning and conclusions on every one of these issues. First, the 
Seventh Circuit held that Thanongsinh’s strong annual employment 
evaluations created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he 
was a qualified employee, notwithstanding the results of his 
certification exam that was itself the focus of the discrimination 
lawsuit.40 His performance evaluations were indeed consistently 
                                                 
34 See id. at 804. 
35 Thanongsinh, 462 F.3d at 772.  
36 Id. at 769-71. 
37 Id. at 770. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 773. 
8
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glowing in the years leading up to 2002. Among other things,41 they 
commended Thanongsinh for “the pride and ownership he shows” for 
the school, his job knowledge and quality of work, his “wide variety of 
skills,” and his attention to detail.42 The court explained that Judge 
Der-Yeghiayan erred in finding that Thanongsinh’s performance on the 
2002 certification exam had objectively shown that Thanongsinh was 
not a qualified employee, for if “the integrity of the administered 
examination is at issue,” the school could not rely on it to attack 
Thanongsinh’s qualification.43 
Second, the court rejected Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s conclusion that 
the evidence on which Thanongsinh relied to identify similarly 
situated custodians lacked proper foundation and was thus 
inadmissible.44 The evidence at issue was a Caucasian custodian’s 
score sheet that the school used to judge his oral certification exam.45 
Like Thanongsinh, the Caucasian custodian had forgotten to bring the 
required materials to the exam, a fact indicated by handwriting in the 
margins of the score sheet.46 However, unlike Thanongsinh, who 
received a zero on that portion of the test, the Caucasian employee’s 
score sheet indicated that the examiner asked that employee questions 
concerning those materials and awarded him points on that portion of 
                                                 
41 Id. at 767 (noting Thanongsinh’s generally outstanding work evaluations and 
specific praise, such as: “[he is] fussy about things being done right;” “he can do 
many things in the way of repairs, and he does so;” and “[he] has a wide variety of 
skills related to maintenance and upkeep of the physical plant, equipment and 
supplies. These skills are evidenced by the work he has done in the areas of 
plumbing, electricity, and HVAC, without assistance of those in the trade.”” 
42 Id. 
43 Id. (citing Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 190 F.3d 799, 807 (7th Cir. 
1999) (observing that, when the standards for assessing qualifications are themselves 
allegedly discriminatory, whether the plaintiff was meeting her employer’s 
“legitimate performance expectations . . . dovetails with the issue of pretext” and 
requires a court to assume, for the purpose of reaching the pretext inquiry, that the 
plaintiff had made out a prima facie case) (parenthetical in original)). 
44 Id. at 774.  
45 Id. at 775. 
46 Id. (noting interviewer’s handwritten remarks “don’t have” next to relevant 
question and “No M.S.D.S.book” in narrative section). 
9
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the exam.47 The district court found that the exam score sheet and 
supervisor’s marginalia were inadmissible hearsay because 
Thanongsinh failed to lay the proper foundation for their 
authenticity.48 However, the Seventh Circuit appeared to be somewhat 
perplexed that Judge Der-Yeghiayan barred this powerful 
circumstantial evidence of a similarly situated employee, and needed 
to expend little effort to find the document admissible under two 
common exceptions to hearsay doctrine.49 As to whether the proper 
foundation for the score sheet’s admission existed, the court noted that 
“a careful examination of the record reveals that defendants have 
conceded the admissibility of [the] score sheet.”50  
Third, the court rejected the district court’s conclusion that 
Thanongsinh had failed to show that the school’s proffered reason for 
his demotion—that he failed the certification exam—was pretextual. 
To show pretext, Thanongsinh pointed to evidence that the school 
conducted the certification exam in a discriminatory manner and the 
supervisor who conducted the oral exam made untoward remarks that 
disparaged Thanongsinh’s English abilities.51 After noting that the 
“district court disregarded each piece of evidence cited by Mr. 
Thanongsinh on this matter as being based on ‘pure speculation’ or 
requiring unreasonable inference,”52 the court proceeded to articulate 
the reasonable inferences that could be drawn from such evidence. 
First, the court held that if Thanongsinh’s contention that the oral 
exam had been administered in a discriminatory fashion was correct, 
                                                 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 770, 775, 776 n.11.  
49 Id. at 775-79. The Seventh Circuit ruled that Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s 
evidentiary ruling was an abuse of discretion because the document was “precisely 
the type” of document that is admissible under the business record exception to the 
hearsay rule. Id. at 776-77 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)) (emphasis added). The court 
buttressed this conclusion by noting that the document would have also been 
admissible against the school as an admission by one of its representatives. Id. at 779 
(citing Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)). 
50 Id. at 778-79 (emphasis added). 
51 Id. at 780-81. 
52 Id. at 780. 
10
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then the school could not rely on the exam’s results as a legitimate 
reason for demoting him.53 The court concluded that the evidence 
suggesting that the school scored the Caucasian custodian in a 
preferential manner supported this contention,54 as did the supervisor’s 
alleged comments, telling Thanongsinh he “should learn better 
English.”55 These comments occurred at a grievance meeting 
convened to review Thanongsinh’s demotion, where the supervisor 
who administered the oral exam allegedly responded to Thanongsinh’s 
complaints about the test by saying that he could not understand 
Thanongsinh, and that Thanongsinh “should learn better English.”56 
Whereas Judge Der-Yeghiayan believed it “unreasonable” to label 
such a comment “in the abstract as an insult,”57 the context of the 
statement led the Seventh Circuit to conclude that it “could be 
reasonably interpreted by a juror as probative evidence that [the 
supervisor] harbored animus against persons for whom English is a 
second language.”58 The court further remarked that interpreting an 
ambiguous statement and “determining the significance of these events 
is a task more appropriate for trial, not for summary judgment.”59  
 
B. Paz v. Wauconda Healthcare  
 
In Paz v. Wauconda Healthcare,60 a decision decided less than a 
week after Thanongsinh, Paz, a chef, sued her former employer, 
Wauconda, under Title VII. Paz alleged that her supervisor 
discriminated against her persistently on the basis of her national 
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 780-81. 
55 Id. at 781-82. 
56 Id. at 781. 
57 Thanongsinh v. Sch. Dist. U-46, No. 03 C 8842, 2005 WL 1866092, at *8 
(N.D. Ill. Jun. 13, 2005). 
58 Thanongsinh, 462 F.3d at 782. 
59 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
60 464 F.3d 659, 661 (7th Cir. 2006). 
11
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origin—Hispanic of Mexican descent—and pregnancy.61 Additionally, 
Paz claimed that her supervisor retaliated against her for complaining 
about discrimination.62 The Seventh Circuit’s recitation of the facts 
catalogued a wealth of alleged incidents that reflected poorly on her 
employer.63 For instance, on one occasion, the supervisor allegedly 
told Paz, “God, you people just come to [the] United States to cause so 
many problems and steal American people’s job[s].”64 A coworker 
reported this comment to an assistant administrator, who, in turn, 
discussed it with Paz, and told Paz to not tell anyone about the 
comment and keep it confidential.65 Paz also alleged that after she first 
told her supervisor that she was pregnant, the supervisor responded, 
“[y]ou’re not going to be allowed to work, to just start getting . . . . Do 
you know what, I think you should move to dietary aide instead of be 
a cook.”66 Afterwards, according to Paz, her supervisor frequently told 
her that she should have an abortion.67 Finally, after Paz complained 
about her supervisor’s conduct to an administrator, her supervisor 
issued a suspicious string of employee warnings against Paz68 and, 
ultimately, told her she was fired.69 
The district court granted Wauconda’s motion for summary 
judgment on all counts and denied Paz’s motion for reconsideration.70 
The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for trial, noting in 
disbelief, “we fail to see how the district court granted summary 
judgment for the defendant.”71 The court’s criticism of Judge Der-
                                                 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 661-63. 
64 Id. at 662 (alterations in original). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 662 (alteration in original). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 665-66 (noting that the warnings even referenced Paz’s complaint of 
discrimination). 
69 Id. at 663-64. 
70 Id. at 661.  
71 Id. at 664, 667 (emphasis added). 
12
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 7
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss1/7
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 3, Issue 1                           Fall 2007 
 
 180
Yeghiayan’s analysis observed that the district court improperly relied 
on a piecemeal view of the alleged events to sidestep “significant 
factual disputes in the record.”72 In addition, the court found that the 
district court’s alternative basis for summary judgment misconstrued 
agency law and lacked common sense.73 
Engaging in a lengthy review of the above-mentioned incidents, 
among others that likewise reflected unfavorably on Wauconda, the 
Seventh Circuit found the record “replete with credibility questions 
and competing versions of facts” that “should be sorted out by the trier 
of fact.”74 In light of the record’s glaring credibility questions and 
competing versions of fact, the court found it “worth mentioning that 
the district court and Wauconda were under the mistaken belief that 
Paz cannot proceed under the direct method [of proof] because some 
of [the supervisor’s] comments were made two months prior to [Paz’s] 
firing.”75 Under the direct method of proof, plaintiffs can rely on direct 
and circumstantial pieces of evidence to show an inference of 
intentional discrimination.76 These pieces of evidence do not have to 
be conclusive separately, but they must compose a convincing 
“mosaic” of discrimination when viewed together.77 The court 
explained that the lapse of time between an allegedly discriminatory 
remark and the termination was not a technical, dispositive bar to 
proceeding under the direct method of proof, but merely went to 
whether the evidence was convincing enough to suggest a “mosaic of 
discrimination.”78 In conclusion, the court admonished the district 
court’s myopic analysis, stating, “a district court cannot view the 
record in small pieces that are mutually exclusive of each other.”79  
                                                 
72 Id. at 666. 
73 Id.  
74 Id. at 665 (emphasis added). 
75 Id. at 666. 
76 Id. at 665. 
77 Id. at 666 (citing Walker v. Bd. Of Regents of University of Wis., 410 F.3d 
387, 394 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
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 The district court reasoned in the alternative that Paz effectively 
abandoned her job and could not claim discriminatory termination 
because Paz did not know her employer’s chain of command, and thus 
could not have known whether her supervisor’s statement, “You’re 
fired,” constituted an actual termination.80 The court quickly disposed 
of this argument, reasoning that under agency law, Paz’s supervisor 
likely had the requisite apparent or actual authority to fire her, insofar 
as the supervisor “had hired [Paz], evaluated her, assigned her work 
schedule, and oversaw her work duties.”81 The court also indirectly 
called the district court’s common sense into question, quipping that 
“we fail to see why, if an employee’s supervisor tells her, ‘You’re 
fired,’ the employee should run this statement up the ladder just to 
double-check her status.”82 
 
C. Valentine v. City of Chicago 
 
Donna Valentine was one of only a handful of female truck 
drivers working for the City of Chicago’s Department of 
Transportation (CDOT).83 Valentine alleged that her coworker, 
Tominello, began sexually harassing her immediately after she started 
working as a driver.84 For a period of six months, she allegedly dealt 
with remarks from Tominello, like “nice ass. It would look good on 
my face.”85 In addition, Valentine alleged that Tominello asked her to 
leave her fiancé on more than twenty occasions, telling her that he 
could show her a better time.86 Further, Valentine alleged that she had 
to reject approximately forty of Tominello’s requests to go out to 
dinner with him.87 
                                                 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Valentine v. City of Chicago, 452 F.3d 670, 680 (2006).  
84 Id. at 675. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
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Valentine contended that she complained to the Lot Supervisor, 
Mike DiTusa, about Tominello’s harassment approximately ten times 
during this time span.88 Valentine understood DiTusa to be her 
supervisor.89 This understanding was common sense: DiTusa held the 
title of Lot Supervisor, and he was responsible for making sure trucks 
were serviced, assigning trucks to drivers, keeping records when 
drivers signed in and out for work, addressing workplace disputes, and 
reporting problems to his superiors.90 However, DiTusa never reported 
Valentine’s complaints to his superiors, even after he witnessed the 
following incident.91 
According to Valentine, Tominello’s harassment culminated in an 
episode in September, where Tominello took a powdered crescent-
shaped cookie into the break room, feigned masturbation with it in 
front of Valentine, and shook the powdered sugar onto her lap.92 
Valentine stated that in response, she yelled at Tominello.93 Later that 
afternoon, Valentine alleged that she “‘saw wet chewed cookie spit on 
the driver’s side window of her car.’”94 Her car was parked in a 
fenced-in area secured by security watchmen at all times.95 Valentine 
complained to DiTusa about the incident, explaining that she believed 
Tominello responsible.96 DiTusa allegedly told her there was nothing 
he could do about it, unless she could prove it.97 Upon returning to her 
car, Valentine said she “‘found a plastic penis under the windshield 
wiper.’”98  
                                                 
88 Id. at 674-75 
89 Id. at 678, 679. 
90 Id. at 674, 678. 
91 Id. at 675-76. 
92 Id. at 675. 
93 Id. at 675-76. 
94 Id. at 675. 
95 Id. at 676-76. 
96 Id. at 676. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
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Later that same day, Valentine bypassed DiTusa and reported the 
incident higher up the chain of command.99 According to Valentine, as 
a result of this, she endured the wrath of her male co-workers; they 
would not speak to her and left her intimidating voice mails.100 She 
alleged that she had to speak with city counselors because of the fear 
and anxiety caused by the incident.101 Subsequently, Valentine was 
transferred and filed suit against the City of Chicago, Ditusa, and 
others, alleging, inter alia, sexual harassment and hostile work 
environment claims under Title VII.102 
To establish a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual 
harassment under Title VII, Valentine had to show that: (1) she was 
subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment in the form of sexual 
advances, requests for sexual favors or other verbal or physical 
conduct of a sexual nature; (2) the harassment was based on sex; (3) 
the sexual harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering with 
the plaintiff’s work performance in creating an intimidating, hostile or 
offensive working environment that affected seriously the 
psychological well-being of the plaintiff; and (4) there is a basis for 
employer liability.103  
The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment in full, finding that Valentine could not prove the fourth 
element of her claim—that there was a basis for employer liability.104 
The Seventh Circuit rejected the district court’s conclusion105 and 
exposed a serious deficiency in the district court’s attention to the 
details of the record.  
According to the district court, Valentine did not put the City on 
notice of Tominello’s alleged harassment by complaining to DiTusa 
                                                 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 
1998). 
104 Valentine, 452 F.3d at 677-79, 681 
105 Id. at 678-80. 
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because DiTusa lacked the authority to transfer employees and thus, 
could not have been Valentine’s supervisor for purposes of Title VII 
liability.106 The essence of supervisory status for purposes of Title VII 
liability depends on the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, 
or discipline an employee.107 Valentine argued that DiTusa had the 
authority to transfer employees,108 but the district court rejected this 
contention as hearsay, explaining that Valentine “‘admitted during her 
deposition that she has no basis other than her own personal belief that 
DiTusa in fact transferred other employees to other yards.’”109 
However, the Seventh Circuit rebuffed this conclusion as “erroneous,” 
stating that Valentine’s argument was “[c]learly” not hearsay, for the 
defendants had admitted in their statement of uncontested facts that 
DiTusa had the power to transfer individuals between various yards 
within CDOT.110  
In addition, the district court concluded that no reasonable trier of 
fact could find that Valentine thought DiTusa was the proper person to 
complain to about sexual harassment.111 To reach this conclusion, the 
district court relied on the fact that three years prior to the alleged 
harassment, Valentine attended a workplace training session, at which 
she received “‘the telephone number and the address of the City’s 
Sexual Harassment Office.’”112 The district court thus reasoned that 
this training session was sufficient to put Valentine on notice that she 
should bring sexual harassment complaints through the City’s Sexual 
Harassment Office only, and not her supervisor.113 However, the 
Seventh Circuit disagreed, noting that the City’s sexual harassment 
policy instructed employees to bring complaints to either the Sexual 
                                                 
106 Id. at 677-79. 
107 Id. at 678 (emphasis in original). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. (emphasis added). 
111 Id. at 679.  
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
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Harassment Office or a supervisor.114 In light of the fact that DiTusa 
supervised Valentine and her colleagues on a daily basis, the Seventh 
Circuit held that this was sufficient to create material question of fact 
as to whether Valentine believed DiTusa to be an appropriate person 
with whom she could lodge a sexual harassment complaint.115  
Finally, the Seventh Circuit noted that because the district court 
rested its decision on DiTusa’s supervisory status, the district court 
failed to consider the remaining dispositive issues: whether Valentine’s 
complaints were sufficient to notify DiTusa that she was being 
sexually harassed, and whether Tominello’s actions were sufficiently 
severe to constitute a hostile work environment.116 Nonetheless, the 
Seventh Circuit analyzed these issues to determine whether there was 
an alternate ground for affirmance, and easily concluded that material 
issues of fact existed on both questions.117  
 
D. Common Themes  
 
The Seventh Circuit’s criticism of the district court in these three 
opinions reveals a recurring pattern in Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s 
employment discrimination rulings, namely that the district court 
judge is too quick to substitute summary judgment for trial. In each 
case, the Court commented on Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s misplaced 
reliance on discrete technical issues that allowed him to sidestep 
blatant factual and credibility disputes at issue. In addition, these 
opinions underscore Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s hastiness, as reflected by 
his tendency to overlook critical factual details in the record. 
In all the opinions discussed above, the Seventh Circuit 
commented on the district court’s misplaced reliance on technical 
barriers to proof of an employee’s intentional discrimination. For 
instance, in Thanongsinh, the court found that the district court abused 
its discretion by improperly excluding evidence of similarly situated 
                                                 
114 Id. at 679-80.  
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 681. 
117 Id. at 680-82. 
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non-minority employees as inadmissible hearsay.118 Likewise, in 
Valentine, the court rejected the district court’s conclusion that the 
plaintiff’s only evidence establishing employer liability was 
inadmissible hearsay.119 Finally, in Paz, the court criticized the district 
court’s assumption that a two month time lapse between allegedly 
discriminatory remarks and the plaintiff’s termination constituted a 
technical barrier to the plaintiff’s ability to proceed under the direct 
method of proof.120 Additionally, the court rejected the district court’s 
effort in Paz to sidestep glaring credibility and factual disputes 
through a faulty application of agency law.121 
Additionally, these three opinions highlight the district judge’s 
hastiness, which caused him to overlook critical facts in the record in 
favor of the employer-defendants. For instance, in Valentine, the 
Seventh Circuit found that two of the district court’s major conclusions 
were contradicted by the record.122 In Thanongsinh, the Seventh 
Circuit likewise found that the district court’s evidentiary ruling was 
contradicted by facts in the record.123 The Seventh Circuit thus 
rebutted several of the district court’s dispositive conclusions by 
merely pointing to facts in the record that the district court had 
overlooked. Additionally, in Valentine, the court noted that the district 
judge had cut its analysis short after ruling for the employer on the 
basis of one issue, and thus had failed to discuss the remaining 
dispositive issues even briefly.124 
                                                 
118 Thanongsinh v. Bd. of Educ., 462 F.3d 762, 775-79 (7th Cir. 2006). See 
supra Part I.A. and note 48. 
119 Valentine, 452 F.3d at 678-79. See supra Part I.C. 
120 Paz v. Wauconda Healthcare and Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 464 F.3d 659, 666 (7th 
Cir. 2006). See supra Part I.B. 
121 464 F.3d at 666; see supra Part I.B. 
122 452 F.3d at 678-79; see supra Part I.C. 
123 462 F.3d at 779; see supra Part I.A. 
124 452 F.3d at 681; see supra Part I.C. 
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It is not likely that the Seventh Circuit would have reviewed the 
record in such great detail125 to rebut the district court’s conclusions on 
these issues if the Seventh Circuit had determined that the plaintiffs in 
these cases lacked a fighting chance on other dispositive issues. 
Accordingly, the tone of the court’s recitation of the facts in these 
decisions makes it clear that the court believed that each case 
presented blatant questions of credibility and disputed facts that should 
have been sorted out at trial—not summary judgment. To achieve this 
tone, the Seventh Circuit underscored details that were exceptionally 
jarring. For instance, in Thanongsinh, the court took great care to 
establish the plaintiff’s exceptional qualities as a custodian,126 which 
effectively made the school’s allegedly preferential treatment of a 
Caucasian custodian127 and the plaintiff’s subsequent demotion appear 
all the more unjust. In Paz, the court focused on the supervisor’s 
shocking comments to the plaintiff, such as the supervisor’s daily 
admonishment to the plaintiff to get an abortion, and the supervisor’s 
derogatory remarks concerning Mexicans.128 In Valentine, the court 
called attention to the plight of women working in a traditionally male 
workplace,129 and the court’s recitation of the facts lingered on 
plaintiff’s account of her male coworker’s obscene and revolting 
behavior towards her.130 This account made her supervisor’s 
subsequent failure to respond to the plaintiff’s sexual harassment 
complaints appear all the more unfair.131 The aggregate rhetorical 
effect of the court’s presentation of the facts begs the question, how 
could the district court have overlooked some of these issues and ruled 
in favor of the employer on technicalities like hearsay? The court’s 
                                                 
125 See, e.g., Thanongsinh, 462 F.3d at 778 (noting “a careful examination of 
the record reveals that the defendants have conceded the admissibility of [the piece 
of evidence at issue].”) 
126 Id. at 767; see supra Part I.A. and note 41. 
127 Thanongsinh, 462 F.3d at 774-75; see supra Part I.A. 
128 464 F.3d at 662. See supra Part I.B. 
129 452 F.3d at 680.  
130 Id. at 675. See supra Part I.C. 
131 Valentine, 452 F.3d at 676. See supra Part I.C. 
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tone thus colors its view of the district court’s efforts to dispose of the 
cases. Whereas a misplaced reliance on technical rulings and 
overlooked facts in cases with borderline frivolous allegations would 
hardly be worth examining, the tone that the Seventh Circuit adopts in 
narrating the facts of the case makes the district court’s mistakes 
appear more egregious. 
 
II. IS THIS A SEVENTH CIRCUIT POLITICAL CHECK ON AN ULTRA- 
CONSERVATIVE APPOINTEE? 
 
Given the unusually high reversal rate of Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s 
employment discrimination decisions over such a short period of time, 
court observers might speculate as to whether the Seventh Circuit’s 
recurring criticisms of the district court in these cases actually convey 
a broader, political message. Specifically, given that Judge Der-
Yeghiayan was recently appointed to the bench by President George 
W. Bush,132 and that the President has never been reticent to appoint 
judges who are compatible with his highly conservative ideology,133 it 
is possible to hypothesize that these three decisions speak more 
broadly to the president’s policy preferences as reflected through his 
judicial appointees. However, given the politically conservative nature 
of the panels that decided these cases, and the judges who authored the 
decisions, it is highly unlikely that these decisions constitute any sort 
of political reproach.134 Nonetheless, these decisions do provide a 
forum to ponder the possibility of a connection between the 
President’s policy values and the decision-making patterns of one of 
his district court appointees.  
Promoting the enforcement of a particular political agenda 
through ideologically driven appointments to the federal judiciary is 
certainly nothing new. Franklin Delano Roosevelt famously appointed 
liberal judges that would grant the federal government more power to 
                                                 
132 Meyers, supra note 10. 
133 See David E. Sanger, In Reading Bush On Court, Words Don’t Always 
Help, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 5, 2005, at A15. 
134 See infra Part III. 
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regulate the economy and not frustrate the president’s New Deal 
projects.135 Decades later, Reagan screened judicial candidates using 
an ideological “litmus tests” to choose jurists who were strict 
constructionists, tough on crime, anti-abortion, and pro-family.136 
Reagan did not hide his methods. As his White House communications 
director, Patrick J. Buchanan, put it, “[Our conservative appointment 
strategy] . . . could do more to advance the social agenda—school 
prayer, anti-pornography, anti-busing, right-to-life and quotas in 
employment—than anything Congress can accomplish in 20 years.”137 
As for President George W. Bush’s appointments, one study found that 
they are the most conservative of any group of judicial appointees 
since before Franklin D. Roosevelt’s presidency.138 The study 
concludes that when making appointments to federal court, “Bush puts 
ideology first.”139 
As for President Bush’s policy concerning employment 
discrimination, he has been assailed by critics for undermining the 
enforcement of traditional civil rights laws through the appointment of 
partisan political managers, line attorneys and other professional staff 
to the Civil Rights Division and the United States Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission.140 Recently, prominent Democrats in the 
Senate attacked the Bush administration for nominating David Palmer 
to take over the EEOC.141 Supervisors, colleagues and subordinates 
that worked alongside Palmer when he was the head of the 
Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division—the agency that 
enforces employment discrimination claims in state and local 
government workplaces—claimed that he significantly underenforced 
                                                 
135 Deborah Sontag, The Power of the Fourth, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, § 6 
(Magazine), at 40. 
136 Id. 
137 ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA 
230-31 (2007). 
138 Sanger, supra note 133. 
139 Id. 
140 See, e.g., Malek, supra note 11; Neil A. Lewis, Justice Department 
Reshapes its Civil Rights Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 14, 2007, at A1. 
141 Malek, supra note 11. 
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discrimination laws during his tenure and did not “understand the 
basic principles of Title VII and constitutional law.”142 Disturbingly, 
there is at least one internal complaint of employment discrimination 
that has been filed against Palmer during his tenure as section chief.143  
President Bush, like his conservative forebears, Ronald Reagan 
and George H.W. Bush,144 appears to have appointed Supreme Court 
Justices who are philosophically adverse to employment 
discrimination rights. In the 1988 term, Reagan’s and Bush I’s 
conservative appointees to the Supreme Court played a large role in 
deciding six major employment discrimination cases,145 and 
commentators subsequently argued that these decisions undercut the 
enforcement of employees’ civil rights.146 Indeed, in the wake of these 
decisions, the Democrat-controlled Congress passed the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991147 to supersede these cases and expand the scope of 
employees’ civil rights. More recently, Supreme Court observers have 
noted148 how President George W. Bush’s recent appointments to the 
Supreme Court impacted the outcome in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co.,149 a decision that commentators contend reflects a highly 
                                                 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith and Thomas R. Hensley, Unfulfilled 
Aspirations: The Court-Packing Efforts of President Reagan and Bush, 57 ALB. L. 
REV. 1111, 1122-24 ( 1994). 
145 Public Employees Retirement Sys. of Oh. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989); 
Independent Fed. of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989); Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 
490 U.S. 900 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
146 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 144. 
147 Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112, 105 Stat. 1071, 1078-79 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(e)(2000)). See Mollica, supra note 1, at 64. 
148 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices’ Ruling Limits Lawsuits on Pay 
Disparity, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2007, at A1 (noting, “this decision showed the 
impact of Justice Alito's presence on the court. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, whom 
he succeeded, would almost certainly have voted the other way, bringing the 
opposite outcome.”). 
149 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007). 
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formalist judicial philosophy that “focuse[s] solely on the 
consequences of the case for employers, rather than for the victims of 
discrimination.”150 
The ideological nature of President Bush’s appointments to the 
United States Court of Appeals has occasionally been brought to the 
foreground by Democrat filibusters in the Senate.151 For instance, 
Democrats in the Senate protested vociferously against the 
appointment of Judge Charles Pickering to the Fifth Circuit and stalled 
his confirmation for some time, largely due to his civil rights record.152 
Appointments to the lower judiciary are less newsworthy and 
rarely the source of controversy.153 However, that is not to say that a 
district court’s decisions cannot reflect policy preferences. A district 
courts’ discretion is hardly corralled by the courts of appeals and the 
United States Supreme Court—even in summary judgment rulings. 
For, as Judge Posner noted, courts of appeals are reluctant to overrule 
grants of summary judgments by lower courts “merely because a 
rational factfinder could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, if 
such a verdict is highly unlikely as a practical matter.”154 This 
admission that district court judges decide cases without trial even 
where a rational factfinder could find for the plaintiff underscores the 
influential role that a district court’s policy preferences can play at the 
summary judgment stage. Thus, examining the three Seventh Circuit 
opinions at issue in this comment provides an opportunity to explore a 
subject matter that is oft overlooked by law reviews and journals, 
                                                 
150 See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—
Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities: “Perception” Against Lofty Formalism 
121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 79-82 (2007). 
151 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Democrats Issue Threat to Block Court Nominees, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2004, at A1. 
152 Adam Liptak, A Judge Appointed by Bush After Impasse in Senate Retires, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2004, at A22. The judge’s critics cited an article he wrote on 
anti-miscegenation laws as a young man and a 1994 trial he presided over in which 
he took steps to reduce the sentence of a man convicted in a cross-burning. Id. 
153 See CARP, supra note 137, at 216. 
154 Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 403 (7th Cir. 1990) (emphasis in 
original). 
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namely the link between a president’s policy preferences and a 
sampling of one of his appointee’s summary judgment rulings.  
Due to the relatively low profile of district court nominations, 
they are less likely to command the personal involvement of the 
president, and are typically left to the judgment of the White House 
Staff or the Justice Department.155 Those who do send forth the names 
of candidates typically consider potential nominees’ political 
affiliations and record of political activity.156 Before his nomination on 
March 5, 2003, Judge Der-Yeghiayan was active in the public sector 
for over 20 years, working as an attorney and then District Counsel for 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).157 In 2000, he was 
appointed to be an immigration review judge under the Clinton 
administration.158 He received numerous distinctions during his time 
with the INS.159 In addition, his nomination was not likely hindered by 
the fact that he was a close college friend of Wes Ashcroft, who is the 
brother of former Attorney General John Ashcroft.160 
In the case of district court appointments, hearings in front of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee are largely perfunctory because the norm 
of senatorial courtesy has essentially already determined whether the 
particular candidate will survive the hearing and be confirmed by the 
Senate.161 Senatorial Courtesy is the unwritten rule that home-state 
senators of the president’s political party have veto power over the 
president’s district judge nominations.162 Notably, during Judge Der-
Yeghiayan’s hearing in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Senators Fitzgerald and Durbin of Illinois both spoke in bipartisan 
                                                 
155 CARP , supra note 137, at 216, 218 (“regardless of who comes up with a 
basic list of names, the Justice Department’s primary duty is to evaluate the 
candidates’ personal, professional, and political qualifications.”). 
156 Id. at 211-12 (noting that at least 90 percent of all federal judicial nominees 
are of the same political party as the appointing president).  
157 Meyers, supra note 10. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 CARP, supra note 137, at 224. 
162 Id. 
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support of the judge’s nomination.163 Senator Fitzgerald commented 
on his public service and the fact that he would be the first immigrant 
of Armenian descent ever nominated and confirmed for the Federal 
Judiciary.164 Senator Durbin likewise commented on the judge’s 
immigrant background, as well as the trust that he had earned from 
both Federal law enforcement and immigrant communities.165 These 
comments concerning the judge’s background dovetail with general 
observations about President Bush’s appointees as a group, which note 
that the President places a high priority on the diverse background of 
his appointments, second in importance only to the nominees’ 
conservative ideology.166 
The politics surrounding judicial appointments can make judges 
hyperconscious of their political sponsors. Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals Judge Michael Luttig, who was recently on the short list of 
President Bush’s picks of nominees for the Supreme Court, recognized 
this pressure, explaining, “Judges are told, ‘You’re appointed by us to 
do these things.’ So then judges start thinking, Well, how do I interpret 
the law to get the result that the people who pushed for me to be here 
want me to get? I believe there’s a natural temptation to line up as 
political partisans that is reinforced by the political process.”167  
According to one empirical study, this kind of political pressure 
also applies to district court judges who seek elevation to the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals.168 This study concluded that the likelihood of a 
U.S. District Court Judge being elevated to the Court of Appeals is 
                                                 
163 Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 108-135 (2003) (statements of Senators Peter Fitzgerald 
and Dick Durbin of Illinois). 
164 Id. 
165 Id.  
166 Sanger, supra note 133. 
167 Sontag, supra note 135. 
168 See Elisha Carol Savchak, Thomas G. Hansford, Donald R. Songer, 
Kenneth L. Manning, & Robert A. Carp, Taking It to the Next Level: The Elevation 
of District Court Judges to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 50 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 478, 
485 (2006).  
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more likely if the judge’s published opinions evince an ideological 
compatibility with the nominating president.169  
Yet another empirical study found a direct correlation between 
district court jurists’ decisions and the policies and values of the 
president who appointed them.170 In this study, presidents who chose 
jurists based on a partisan, ideological basis were more likely to obtain 
district court jurists whose supported their policy views.171 For 
instance, judges appointed by a liberal president on a partisan, 
ideological basis were more likely to take a broadening position on 
civil rights than conservative jurists.172 Similarly such liberal judges 
were more likely to rule for labor interests, whereas as conservative 
judge would tend to side with business interests.173 The percentage of 
“liberal” decisions rendered by Jimmy Carter’s appointees was 54 
percent, whereas the percentage of “liberal” decisions published by 
Gerald Ford’s and Ronald Reagan’s appointees were 45 percent and 36 
percent respectively.174  
President George W. Bush has often expressed his intention to 
appoint Supreme Court justices in the same ideological mold as those 
appointed by Nixon and Reagan.175 Thus, it is reasonable to suppose 
that this intention applies equally to his appointees to the federal 
district courts, especially seeing as how the President used partisan, 
ideological criteria even when hiring traditionally non-political U.S. 
                                                 
169 Id. (noting that “[t]he extent to which the judge’s published decisions are 
congruent with the president’s preferences . . . also exerts a positive and significant 
effect on the judge’s chances for being elevated to an appeals court vacancy. Judges 
deciding cases in a conservative manner, for example, are more likely to be elevated 
when a Republican president is in office. The decisions published by a district court 
judge act as a signal to the president regarding the relevant preferences of the judge 
and thus their likely future behavior on an appeals court.”). 
170 See CARP, supra note 137, at 238-39. 
171 Id. at 229-30. 
172 Id. at 234 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 236. 
175 See Jeffrey Rosen, Can Bush Deliver a Conservative Supreme Court?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, § 4 (Week In Review Desk), at 1. 
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Attorneys176 and career staff in the Department of Justice.177 Notably, 
beginning in 2003 under Attorney General John Ashcroft, the DOJ 
took strong conservative credentials into account when hiring 
traditionally non-political career professionals for the Department of 
Justice’s civil rights division.178 Successful applicants’ resumes reflect 
that these strong conservative credentials included membership in the 
Republican National Lawyers Association and the Federalist Society, 
and limited civil rights experience.179  
If these were the credentials that Attorney General Ashcroft’s 
Justice Department looked for in hiring traditionally non-political 
career attorneys, then it is reasonable to suspect that Ashcroft looked 
for similar ideological qualifications when screening judicial 
nominees. It is likewise a reasonable assumption that Ashcroft was 
familiar with Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s policy and political preferences 
prior to the nomination process because the Judge was a close, 
personal friend of the Attorney General’s brother.180 This leads us to 
the question: do the Seventh Circuit’s three opinions that reversed 
Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s summary judgment rulings reflect any 
correlation between President Bush’s policy preferences and the 
district judge’s decision-making tendencies in employment 
discrimination cases?  
Looking at the patterns indicated by the Seventh Circuit’s 
criticism of Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s analysis, it is not difficult to 
                                                 
176 See David Johnston & Eric Lipton, E-Mail Identified G.O.P. Candidates for 
Justice Jobs, N.Y. TIMES , Apr. 14, 2007, at A1. 
177 Alia Malek, Bush’s long history of politicizing justice, SALON, Mar. 30, 
2007, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/03/30/civil_rights/index.html. 
178 Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. probes its hirings: Investigating for bias 
toward conservatives, THE BOSTON GLOBE, May 31, 2007, at A1; David Johnston & 
Eric Lipton, Ex-Justice Aide Admits Politics Affected Hiring, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 
2007, at A1 (quoting top Justice Department aide, Monica Goodling, testifying to 
Congress that she had “gone too far in asking political questions of applicants for 
career positions and I may have taken inappropriate political considerations into 
account.”). 
179 Savage, supra note 178. 
180 See Meyers, supra note 10. 
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discern traces of President Bush’s policy imprint on the district court’s 
rulings. To begin with, although the Seventh Circuit repeatedly noted 
how Judge Der-Yeghiayan misconstrued the Federal Rules of 
Evidence,181 misapplied agency law,182 and misunderstood the law 
concerning the direct method of proving intentional discrimination,183 
all of the judge’s mistakes favored the defendant-employer and 
precluded the plaintiff-employee’s discrimination claims. Likewise, 
although the Seventh Circuit consistently found that Judge Der-
Yeghiayan had overlooked critical facts in the record,184 the judge’s 
inattention to detail always favored the employers. A judge’s mistakes 
should, in theory, benefit both sides if they result from random 
misapplications of law or careless inattention to the factual record. 
However, these three decisions are an extremely small sample 
size. As a result, it is far too easy to read conclusions into these 
opinions based on what is already known about the Judge’s 
backgrounds. Looking beyond the three decisions discussed by this 
comment, Judge Der-Yeghiayan has ruled on summary judgment 
motions in 49 employment discrimination cases, and plaintiffs in those 
cases have withstood summary judgment only 6 times.185 And in those 
6 cases where the plaintiffs survived summary judgment, only 2 
escaped entirely unscathed;186 the district court granted partial 
summary judgment for the employer in the remaining 4 cases.187 
                                                 
181 See supra Part I.D. 
182 Id. at 19. 
183 Id.. 
184 See supra Part I.D. 
185 This dataset was developed by culling all Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s 
employment discrimination summary judgment decisions through November 2007 
from Lexis’s database, using the same criteria discussed supra note 7. 
186 Farina v. Ciccone Food Prods., No. 04 C 2383, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
9962 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2005); Loera v. AMTRAK, No. 02 C 736, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16979 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2004). 
187 Carlson v. Ill. Cmty. College Dist. 525, No. 05 C 5975, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 73653 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2006); Grew v. Kmart Corp. of Ill., Inc., No. 05 C 
2022, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6994 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2006); Santos v. Boeing Co., 
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While these numbers might discourage employment discrimination 
plaintiffs who find themselves before Judge Der-Yeghiayan, 
conclusions about the district court’s policy preferences based on these 
statistics alone would be premature without a statistical comparison to 
other district judges. A conclusion that Judge Der-Yeghiayan harbors 
an employer bias is also contradicted by lawyers’ evaluations of the 
judge, which mostly report that the judge is not biased in any way. 188 
Thus, there is no firm statistical or anecdotal basis suggesting that 
the Seventh Circuit’s three opinions discussed in this comment are 
indicative of a broader correlation between President Bush’s 
employment discrimination policy preferences and his recent 
appointee’s summary judgment rulings. Nonetheless, there is certainly 
nothing in these opinions that provides reassurance for those who 
suspect otherwise. 
 
III. NO (THE ABSENCE OF A POLITICIZED EXPLANATION). 
 
Whatever one might be able to read into the Seventh Circuit’s 
criticism of Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s employment discrimination 
decisions, it is highly unlikely that the Court intended its three 
opinions to contain any political subtext. The politically conservative 
reputations of the panelists who voted on the opinion and the opinions’ 
authors undercuts assertions to the contrary. Additionally, the tone of 
the Seventh Circuit’s criticisms of the district court is uniformly 
                                                                                                                   
No. 02 C 9310, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17666 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2004); Chears v. 
Potter, No. 03 C 115, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17238 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2004). 
188 See The Chicago Council of Lawyers, An Evaluation of the United States 
District Court Judges in Chicago (2006), http://www.chicagocouncil.org (“Lawyers 
do not report that Judge Der-Yeghiayan is biased in any way or susceptible to any 
outside influences.”). But see Aspen Law & Bus., 1 Almanac of the Federal 
Judiciary, 7th Cir. Section at 9-10 (2007-2 Supp.) (concluding that “[Judge Der-
Yeghiayan] is fair-to-defense oriented in civil matters, according to lawyers who 
represent both plaintiffs and defendants,” and including the following evaluations by 
lawyers: “He is a total pawn for the government, big business, and any large 
entity” . . . “He leans totally to big business and the government. The little guy and 
the underdog do not stand a chance” . . . “It is sickening how pro-government he is. 
It is easier to give it all to the prosecution”). 
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tempered and moderate, which undermines speculation that the Court 
sought to accuse Judge Der-Yeghiayan of harboring any unseemly 
political bias in favor of employers. 
However, the shared themes of the criticism in the Seventh 
Circuit’s opinions do correlate with some of the more salient traits of 
the Seventh Circuit’s employment discrimination jurisprudence. 
Namely, the Court has previously made it clear that district courts 
must not use summary judgment as a means for docket clearing. Also, 
the Court has repeatedly expressed an aversion to bright line rules and 
technical barriers that preclude courts from going further to reach the 
merits of the case. Therefore, the Court’s common, frequent criticisms 
of the district court in these three opinions can be explained as a kind 
of socialization process, which seeks to implant the Circuit’s own 
values and tendencies in a recently appointed district judge. 
An examination of the political makeup of the Seventh Circuit 
jurists who reversed Judge Der-Yeghiayan makes it highly unlikely 
that these opinions implicitly signal any sort of broad check on a 
politically partisan appointee.  
First, all of the Seventh Circuit jurists who authored Thanongsinh, 
Paz, and Valentine were appointed by Republican presidents: President 
Reagan appointed Judges Ripple and Flaum, the authors of 
Thanongsinh and Valentine; and President Ford appointed Judge 
Bauer, the author of Paz.189 Working under the assumption that 
Republican Presidents Reagan and Ford appointed judges who were 
politically sympathetic with their own conservative policies and 
values,190 it would be incongruous for these judges to express any 
broad criticism of the current Republican President’s policies through 
attacks on one of his recent district judge appointments. 
Second, judicial evaluations have consistently described these 
judges’ reputations as moderate to conservative. Both Judges Ripple 
and Bauer are described as being open-minded and impartial, but 
                                                 
189 Aspen Law & Bus., 2 Almanac of the Federal Judiciary, 7th Cir. Section at 
10, 24, 34 (2008-1 Supp.). 
190 See supra Part II. 
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moderately conservative.191 Whereas one evaluation describes Judge 
Flaum as having no leaning in civil or criminal matters,192 another 
suggests that his conservative policy preferences have, at times, 
colored his opinions, including labor disputes.193 Notably, a major 
employment discrimination case authored by Judge Flaum’s 
disappointed employment discrimination plaintiffs; this decision was 
affirmed by Supreme Court of the Reagan-Bush Era, and then 
superseded by the Democrat-controlled Congress in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991.194 However, Judge Flaum has asserted his political 
independence. On three occasions,195 the judge sharply criticized the 
Reagan Justice Department for failing to fulfill a Carter administration 
pledge to make adequate resources available to Chicago schools for 
the implementation of school desegregation plans.196 Yet, he has never 
levied such criticism at judges. Judge Flaum is noted for treating 
district courts with great deference.197 Additionally, Judge Flaum, 
joined by Judge Bauer, wrote a special concurrence criticizing 
plaintiffs’ lawyers in an anti-trust case for accusing Judge Posner of 
                                                 
191 See 2 Almanac of the Federal Judiciary, supra note 190, at 25, 36. 
192 See id at 12-13. 
193 Chicago Lawyer’s Council, Evaluation of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, supra note 1, at 771 (comparing Montgomery Ward 
& Co. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that the judge showed 
“virtually no deference to the NLRB, refusing to enforce an NLRB bargaining order 
and leaving unremedied some extreme labor law violations”) with Cowherd v. HUD, 
827 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that the judge “showed great deference to a 
HUD decision to sell and essentially abandon a floundering public housing unit 
without requiring future rent subsidies”)). 
194 Id. at 771-72 (citing Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 827 F.2d 163 
(7th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 490 U.S. 900 (1989)). 
195 United States v. Board of Educ., 799 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1986); United 
States v. Board of Educ., 744 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Board of 
Educ., 717 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1983). 
196 Board of Educ., 744 F.2d at 1308. See Chicago Lawyer’s Council, 
Evaluation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, supra note 
1, at 775-77. 
197 Chicago Lawyer’s Council, Evaluation of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, supra note 1, at 769. 
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acting with bias.198 Therefore, it would be out of character for any of 
these judges to author decisions that attacked a district judge for 
harboring a conservative bias in employment discrimination cases. 
For many of the same reasons, it is unlikely that Judge Posner, 
who joined the opinions in Paz and Thanongsinh, or Judge Kanne, 
who joined the opinion in Thanongsinh, would have been interested in 
attaching their names to opinions that attacked a district judge’s 
politically conservative policy preferences. Both are Reagan 
appointees with conservative reputations.199 One judicial evaluation 
even contains criticism of Judge Kanne for leaning towards 
employers’ interests.200 Thus, it would be highly out of character for 
these judges to join in any criticism of a district judge for ruling in a 
politically partisan direction on employment discrimination issues. 
Finally, the tone of the Seventh Circuit’s criticisms in these three 
opinions is too moderate and tempered to rise to the level of a 
politicized rebuke of the district judge. Although the Seventh Circuit 
has shown that is unafraid to employ severe language to criticize 
judges, no such language is evident in these opinions. For instance, the 
Court provided a sampling of its own scathing criticisms of 
Immigration Judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals in 
Benslimane v. Gonzales,201 including comments such as: 
  
“the [immigration judge’s] opinion is riddled with 
inappropriate and extraneous comments” . . . “this very 
significant mistake suggests that the Board was not 
aware of the most basic facts of [the petitioner’s] 
case” . . . “the procedure that the [immigration judge] 
employed in this case is an affront to [petitioner’s] right 
to be heard” . . . the immigration judge’s factual 
                                                 
198 Id. at 774-75 (citing Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western Union 
Telephone Co., 797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir.), reh'g denied, 802 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1986)). 
199 See 2 Almanac of the Federal Judiciary, supra note 190, at 14, 22. 
200 Chicago Lawyer’s Council, Evaluation of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, supra note 1, at 778. 
201 430 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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conclusion is “totally unsupported by the record” . . . 
“the immigration judge’s unexplained conclusion is 
“hard to take seriously” . . . “the elementary principles 
of administrative law, the rules of logic, and common 
sense seem to have eluded the Board in this as in other 
cases.”202 
 
No criticism in these three opinions rises to the level of severity of 
those scalding attacks. For instance, the district court’s erroneous 
evidentiary rulings are underscored indirectly. In Valentine, to refute 
the district court’s contention that a critical piece of evidence relied on 
by the plaintiff was solely based on the plaintiff’s “own speculation,” 
the Seventh Circuit merely stated, “Clearly, this is not a hearsay 
statement by [the plaintiff]—it is an admission by [the defendants],” 
and then pointed to the defendants’ statement of uncontested facts, 
which corroborated the plaintiff’s “speculation.”203 Additionally, Judge 
Bauer’s criticisms are almost overly deferential to the district judge, 
remarking, “It is worth mentioning that the district court and 
Wauconda were under the mistaken belief that Paz cannot proceed 
under the direct method because some of [the supervisor’s] comments 
were made two months prior to her firing.”204 Judge Bauer’s remarks 
are curious because it seems unremarkable to note that the defendants 
were arguing against the plaintiff’s position; courts of appeals reverse 
district court’s rulings, not the positions argued by the advocates. 
However, this tone dovetails with court observers’ remarks that Judge 
Bauer is overly deferential towards district judges.205 In sum, none of 
                                                 
202 Id. at 829 (citations omitted). See generally, John R. Floss, Seeking Asylum 
in a Hostile System: The Seventh Circuit Reverses to Confront a Broken Process, 1 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 216 (2006), at http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v1-1/floss.pdf. 
203 Valentine v. City of Chicago, 452 F.3d 670, 678 (2006). See also 
Thanongsinh v. Bd. Of Educ., 462 F.3d 762, 776 (2006) (noting evidence excluded 
by district court as hearsay was “precisely the type of ‘memorandum’ or ‘record’ that 
falls within the ambit of the business record exception”). 
204 Paz v. Wauconda Healthcare and Rehab. Ctr., 464 F.3d 659, 666 (2006). 
205 Chicago Lawyer’s Council, Evaluation of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, supra note 1, at 730 (citing Higgins v. White Sox 
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the criticisms in these opinions reach the level of severity that the 
Court has clearly shown itself capable of reaching. Thus, it is 
unreasonable to conclude that these opinions contain an intentional, 
politicized subtext, attacking the district judge for granting employers’ 
motions for summary judgment in an untoward, partisan manner. 
 
IV. THE SOCIALIZATION OF A RECENT JUDICIAL APPOINTEE 
 
Another explanation for the consistent pattern of criticisms 
reflected by these opinions is that Judge Der-Yeghiayan is a new judge 
and relatively inexperienced in matters unrelated to immigration law. 
This possibility is corroborated by lawyers’ evaluations of the district 
judge, which frequently comment on his inexperience and its negative 
impact on his rulings.206 Although lawyers’ evaluations must always 
be taken with a grain of salt because it is to be expected that losing 
parties will complain about the judge’s abilities, lawyers’ criticisms 
concerning Judge Der-Yeghiayan are surprisingly consistent.207 
                                                                                                                   
Baseball Club, Inc., 787 F.2d 1125, 1131 (7th Cir. 1986) (Bauer, J., dissenting) 
(objecting to a remand for a new trial because of garbled and error-filled jury 
instructions, based largely on the ground that the trial judge was "a veteran of ten 
years on the district court and twelve years as a trial and appellate court judge of the 
state of Illinois")). 
206 See e.g., 1 Almanac of the Federal Judiciary, supra note 189, at 9-10 (“He 
is legally incompetent in both criminal and civil matters. He doesn’t have much real 
experience. It is frightening” . . . “His background makes him ill-suited to be a 
federal judge. He is equally incompetent when dealing with either civil or criminal 
matters” . . . “He has no idea what he is doing.”); Chicago Council of Lawyers, An 
Evaluation of the United States District Court Judges in Chicago, supra note 188, at 
10 (“many of the lawyers interviewed about Judge Der-Yeghiayan reported that he 
lacks an adequate understanding of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
suggested that the judge’s background has not prepared him to assume such an 
important post”). 
207 Chicago Council of Lawyers, An Evaluation of the United States District 
Court Judges in Chicago, supra note 188, at 10 (noting that “the vast majority of 
lawyers interviewed gave [Judge Der-Yeghiayan] poor marks on virtually all areas 
relevant to the Council’s evaluation, and these poor marks are consistent with the 
ratings given to Judge Der-Yeghiayan by respondents to the Council’s written 
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Moreover, these opinions were not the first time in 2006 that the 
Seventh Circuit had to educate the district judge in a particular area of 
law. Earlier that year, in Murray v. GMAC Mortgage Co.,208 the 
Seventh Circuit reversed Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s denial of class 
certification, and explained how each of the four reasons given for the 
denial was improper.  
There is a qualitative difference between these opinions and other 
Seventh Circuit opinions in 2006 that reversed different district 
judge’s summary judgment rulings on employment discrimination 
matters. For instance, none of these other opinions call attention to 
critical facts in the record that were overlooked by the district 
judges.209 Instead, these opinions tend to deal with garden variety 
disagreements with the district court over resolving unsettled areas of 
law,210 interpreting Seventh Circuit precedent,211 and weighing the 
evidence in view of what a reasonable jury could possibly conclude.212 
In one such decision, the Seventh Circuit even acknowledged that the 
proper interpretation of the controlling precedent was not obvious.213 
Accordingly, the qualitative difference between the opinions that 
reversed Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s decisions and the opinions reversing 
different district judges makes it more likely that the criticisms in 
Thanongsinh, Paz, and Valentine are not merely random. The 
exceptional nature of these opinions may be explained as instructive, 
                                                                                                                   
survey. . . [I]n comparison to his fellow judges in the Northern District of Illinois, 
Judge Der-Yeghiayan was rated below average in every survey category.”). 
208 434 F.3d 948 (2006). 
209 Goodwin v. Bd of Trs. Of the Univ. of Ill., 442 F.3d 611 (2006); Maalik v. 
Int’l Union of Elevator Constructors, Local 2, 437 F.3d 650 (2006); Phelan v. Cook 
County, 463 F.3d 773 (2006); EEOC v. Target Corp., 460 F.3d 946 (2006); Patton v. 
Keystone RV Co., 455 F.3d 812 (2006); Roe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704 
(2006); Smith v. Castaways Family Diner, 453 F.3d 971 (2006); Sylvester v. SOS 
Children’s Vills. Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900; Burnett v. LFW Inc., 472 F.3d 471 (2006). 
210 See, e.g., Phelan, 463 F.3d at 780-81. 
211 See, e.g., Patton, 455 F.3d at 816-17. 
212 See, e.g., Target Corp., 460 F.3d at 955-56, 961-62; Patton, 455 F.3d at 
817-18 
213 Smith, 453 F.3d at 984. 
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an effort to educate a new district judge about the finer points of 
evidentiary rulings and methods for proving intentional discrimination 
in employment law. 
The Seventh Circuit’s criticism of Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s 
inattention to critical details in the record also reflects another trend in 
the district judge’s decisions that finds corroboration in evaluations of 
the judge’s performance. Namely, both the district judge’s detractors 
and defenders all agree that the judge makes short work of his 
docket.214 In fact, at Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s confirmation before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Fitzgerald praised the district 
judge for his ability to handle “one of the heaviest case loads in the 
entire immigration court system.”215 Thus, it is possible that the 
Seventh Circuit opinions are telling the district judge to slow down a 
bit and proceed with more caution. 
When these criticisms are read in conjunction, they can be 
explained as a sort of socialization of a newly appointed judge to the 
norms and tendencies of the Seventh Circuit’s jurisprudence. First, the 
opinions reflect some of the Seventh Circuit’s more general statements 
that warn district courts against using summary judgment as a means 
of docket control. Second, the criticisms reflect the Seventh Circuit’s 
aversion to hyper-technical barriers that preclude proof of an 
employer’s intent to discriminate. 
First, the Seventh Circuit’s criticism of the district court’s 
inattention to critical factual details in the record reflects the Seventh 
Circuit’s broader concerns about district court’s over-reliance on 
summary judgment as a means of quickly disposing of rapidly 
expanding case loads. In Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc.,216 Judge 
                                                 
214 See, e.g., 1 Almanac of the Federal Judiciary, supra note 189, at 9-10 
(comparing one attorney’s observation, “Be prepared. I think he has one of the 
shortest calendars from filing to trial. He does not like to give continuances. I think 
he is a terrific person and judge. His rulings are quick” . . . with others’, “File your 
brief late and he will throw the case out” . . . “He is more interested in his schedule 
than in his cases.”).  
215 Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, supra note 164. 
216 103 F.3d 1394 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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Posner warned district courts against using Rule 56217 as a means of 
docket control, stating: 
 
The expanding federal caseload has contributed to a 
drift in many areas of federal litigation toward 
substituting summary judgment for trial. The drift is 
understandable, given caseload pressures that in 
combination with the Speedy Trial Act sometimes make 
it difficult to find time for civil trials in the busier 
federal districts. But it must be resisted unless and until 
Rule 56 is modified.218 
 
In Thanongsinh and Valentine, the Seventh Circuit criticized the 
district court for disposing of the case on summary judgment based on 
conclusions that were contradicted by overlooked facts in the 
record.219 Additionally, in Valentine, the court noted the district judge’s 
incomplete analysis of all the dispositive issues.220 Thus, these 
opinions reflect one of the Court’s larger concerns that district judges 
are being cavalier in granting summary judgment, in violation of the 
demands of Rule 56. 
Additionally, these three decisions reflect the Seventh Circuit’s 
relative skepticism about technical barriers that preclude an 
employer’s liability. Judge Easterbrook noted the simplicity with 
which courts should view employment discrimination cases by 
suggesting the following formulation for an ADEA jury instruction: 
“You must decide whether the employer would have fired [demoted, 
laid off] the employee if the employee had been younger than 40 and 
everything else had remained the same.”221 Although this is clearly not 
                                                 
217 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 
218 Wallace, 103 F.3d at 1397 (citations omitted). 
219 See supra Part I.D. 
220 Id. 
221 Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340 (7th Cir. 1994). The Court has 
continued to urge this standard for employment discrimination in subsequent 
opinions. See, e.g., Fuka v. Thomson Consumer Elec., 82 F.3d 1397 (7th Cir. 1996); 
38
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 7
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss1/7
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 3, Issue 1                           Fall 2007 
 
 206
the standard that the Seventh Circuit uses for ruling on employment 
discrimination summary judgment motions, it nonetheless expresses 
the Court’s allergy to overly technical methods of disposing 
employment discrimination cases that prevent courts from reaching the 
merits of the case. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit has, in the past, 
rejected half a dozen technical arguments and defenses advanced by 
employers.222 For instance, prior to the Supreme Court’s resolution of 
the issue in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,223 several 
Circuits allowed an employer to uncover evidence of an employee’s 
misconduct on the job through the discovery process and then use such 
evidence as an affirmative defense to discrimination claims, even if 
such evidence was not known to the employer at the time of the 
allegedly discriminatory action.224 However, the Seventh Circuit 
allowed employers to use such “after-acquired” evidence only to limit 
back pay from the date the alleged misconduct was discovered.225 
Along those same lines, in the three opinions discussed by this 
comment, the Seventh Circuit was highly skeptical of the district 
court’s efforts to dispose of cases that were “replete”226 with 
credibility issues and contested matters of facts227 solely on the basis 
of technicalities. For instance, the Court rejected the district judge’s 
reasoning in Thanongsinh and Valentine, which heavily relied on 
                                                                                                                   
Kuhn v. Ball State Univ., 78 F.3d 330 (7th Cir. 1996); Umpleby v. Potter & 
Brumfield, Inc., 69 F.3d 209 (7th Cir. 1995). 
222 Including: “pretext-plus;” “the after-acquired evidence rule;” “tender back,” 
and “estoppel of ADA Claims.” See generally Mollica, supra note 1 , at 100-11 
(describing Seventh Circuit’s rejection of all these various technical defenses to 
discrimination). 
223 513 U.S. 352 (1995). 
224 See e.g., Welch v. Liberty Machine Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403 (8th Cir. 
1994); Dotson v. United States Postal Service, 977 F.2d 976 (6th Cir. 1992); and 
Summers v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988). 
225 See Kristufek v. Hussman Food Service Co., 985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993).  
226 Paz v. Wauconda Healthcare and Rehab. Ctr., LLC, 464 F.3d 659, 666 (7th 
Cir. 2006). 
227 See supra Part I.D. 
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findings that key evidence was “inadmissible” hearsay.228 
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit admonished the district court for 
adhering to a non-existent formal barrier to a plaintiff’s use of the 
“direct” method of proof.229 This is not to say that the Seventh Circuit 
would be entirely adverse to correctly reasoned summary judgment 
decisions that reflected a formalist philosophy, but the Court’s 
skepticism of Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s efforts to sidestep the merits by 
basing his conclusions on technicalities does reflect the Seventh 
Circuit’s tendency to look past formal, technical barriers to an 
employer’s liability to reach the merits of the case. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Although all participants and actors in the legal system must act 
as if the law is a neutral arbiter—and judges “umpire”230— this hardly 
dampens the speculation among court observers and attorneys that a 
judge’s personal values and policy preferences can impact cases 
substantially. The discretion afforded to district judges—even at the 
summary judgment phase231—provides them with an immediate and 
practical means to shape the outcome of their decisions in accordance 
with their personal policy preferences.232 Thus, the specter of political 
partisanship is often unavoidable when attempting to explain a series 
of opinions. However, speculation about the politicization of the 
judicial sphere can also cloud an understanding of what courts’ 
opinions are really attempting to communicate.  
This comment examined trends in a series of summary judgment 
employment discrimination opinions that reversed the same district 
judge, Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan. The Seventh Circuit’s criticisms 
                                                 
228 See Part I.D. 
229 Id. 
230 As Chief Justice Roberts put it during his confirmation hearing. Robin 
Toner & David D. Kirkpatrick, Liberals and Conservatives Remain Worlds Apart on 
Roberts’s Suitability, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2005, at A22. 
231 See Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 403 (7th Cir. 1990); supra 
Introduction. 
232 See CARP, supra note 137, at 229-30. 
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of the district judge shared common themes and expressed a pattern. It 
thus appeared that the Seventh Circuit was communicating something 
broader than the holdings themselves. Due to the fact that this district 
judge had recently been appointed by President George W. Bush, 
whose record for politicizing traditional civil rights enforcement and 
the judicial sphere is often noted,233 it was reasonable to suspect that 
the Seventh Circuit’s criticisms spoke to this subject matter. 
However, this hypothesis defeated itself. Proceeding under the 
assumption that judges tend to reflect the values and policy 
preferences of the presidents who appointed them,234 it was impossible 
to square the politically conservative makeup of the Seventh Circuit 
judges who decided these three opinions with an argument that these 
opinions were intended to emphasize Judge Der-Yeghiayan’s partisan 
bias or communicate a broader political critique of the Executive 
Branch’s civil rights policy. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit’s criticisms 
of the district judge in these opinions may be consistent and express a 
pattern, but they are not nearly severe enough to suggest that the 
district judge harbors a partisan bias in favor of employers. 
Nonetheless, this comment concluded that these three opinions do 
not express a merely random pattern of criticism. Instead, the Seventh 
Circuit’s criticisms can be read as an attempt to socialize a newly 
appointed judge. This explanation coincides with judicial evaluations, 
which emphasize the district judge’s relative unfamiliarity with his 
new duties and the judge’s tendency to work quickly. Additionally, this 
explanation makes sense because the Seventh Circuit’s criticisms 
reflect some of the Court’s broader norms, such as the Court’s 
concerns over district courts’ abuse of summary judgment. Also, the 
criticisms correlate with the Seventh Circuit’s general distaste for 
technical defenses and barriers to employment discrimination claims. 
Thus, these opinions represent an effort to bring a district judge’s 
wayward decision-making tendencies more in line with certain salient 
features of the Seventh Circuit’s employment discrimination 
jurisprudence. 
                                                 
233 See supra Part II. 
234 See CARP, supra note 137, at 238-39; supra Part II. 
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